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Abstract:  We argue that the present crisis and stalling economy continuing since 2007 have clear origins, namely in the 
delusionary belief in the merits of policies based on a “perpetual  money machine” type of thinking. Indeed, we document 
strong evidence that, since the early 1980s, consumption has been increasingly funded by smaller savings, booming financial 
profits, wealth extracted from house price appreciation and explosive debt. This is in stark contrast with the productivity-
fueled growth that was seen in the 1950s and 1960s. This transition, starting in the early 1980s, was further supported by a 
climate of deregulation and a massive growth in financial derivatives designed to spread and diversify the risks globally. The 
result has been a succession of bubbles and crashes, including the worldwide stock market bubble  and great  crash of 19 
October 1987, the savings and loans crisis of the 1980s, the burst in 1991 of the enormous Japanese real estate  and stock 
market bubbles  and its ensuing “lost decades”, the emerging markets bubbles  and  crashes  in 1994 and  1997, the  LTCM  
crisis of 1998, the  dotcom  bubble  bursting  in 2000, the  recent  house price  bubbles, the financialization bubble  via 
special  investment  vehicles,  speckled with acronyms like CDO, RMBS and CDS, the stock market bubble,  the commodity 
and oil bubbles and the debt bubbles, all developing jointly and feeding on each other until the climax of 2008, which 
brought our financial system close to collapse. Rather than still hoping that real wealth will come out of money creation, an 
illusion also found in the current management of the on-going European sovereign and banking crises, we need 
fundamentally new ways of thinking. Governing is the art of planning and prediction.  In uncertain times, it is essential,  
more than  ever,  to think  in scenarios: what can happen in the future,  and, what would be the effect on your wealth and 
capital? How can you protect yourself and your dearest against adverse scenarios? We thus end by examining the question 
“what can we do?” from the macro level, discussing the fundamental issue of incentives and of constructing and predicting 
scenarios as well as developing investment insights. 
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1-A contemporary economic  myth 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
There is no use trying,” said Alice. “One can’t believe impossi- 
ble things.” “I daresay you haven’t had much practice,” said the 
Queen. “When I was your age, I always did it for half an hour 
a day. Why, sometimes  I’ve believed as many as six impossible 
things before breakfast.” ~Lewis  Carroll 
Chasing fantasies  is not the exclusive pastime  of little girls in 
fairy tales. History  is speckled  with colorful  stories  of distin- 
guished  scientists  and  highly  motivated inventors pursuing 
the holy grail of technology:  the construction of a perpetual 
motion  machine.  These  are  stories  of  eccentric  boys  with 
flashy toys, dreaming of the fame and wealth  that  would re- 
ward the invention of the ultimate gizmo, a machine  that can 
operate without  depleting any power source, thereby solving 
forever  our energy  problems. In the mid-1800s, thermody- 
namics provided the formal basis on what common  sense in- 
forms us: it is not possible to create  energy out of nothing.  It 
can be extracted from wood, gas, oil or even human  work as 
was done for most of human history, but there are no inex- 
haustible sources. 
What about  wealth? Can it be created out of thin air? Surely, 
a central  bank  can print  crispy banknotes and, by means  of 
the modern electronic equivalent, easily add another zero to 
its balance sheet. But what is the deeper meaning of this mon- 
ey creation? Does  it create  real  value?  Common  sense  and 
Austrian economists in particular would  argue  that  money 
creation outpacing real  demand is a recipe  for inflation.  In 
this piece, we show that the question is much more subtle and 
interesting, especially  for understanding the extraordinary 
developments since  2007. While  it is true  that,  like  energy, 
wealth cannot  be created out of thin air, there is a fundamen- 
tal difference: whereas  the belief of some marginal  scientists 
in a perpetual motion  machine  had essentially  no impact, its 
financial  equivalent has  been  the  hidden  cause  behind  the 
current economic  impasse. 
The Czech economist Tomáš  Sedláček  argues  that, while we 
can understand old economic  thinking  from  ancient  myths, 
we can also learn a lot about  contemporary myths from mod- 
ern economic thinking. A case in point is the myth, developed 
in the last thirty  years, of an eternal economic  growth, based 
on  financial  innovations, rather  than  on  real  productivity 
gains  strongly  rooted in better management, improved de- 
sign, and fueled by innovation and creativity. This has created 
an illusion that value can be extracted out of nothing; the 
mythical story of the perpetual money  machine, dreamed up 
before  breakfast. 
To put things in perspective, we have to go back to the post- 
WWII era. It was characterized by 25 years of reconstruction 
and a third  industrial revolution, which introduced comput- 
ers, robots  and  the  Internet. New infrastructure, innovation 
and technology led to a continuous increase  in productivity. 
In that  period,  the financial sphere  grew in balance  with the 
real economy.  In the 1970s, when the Bretton Woods  system 
was terminated and the oil and inflation  shocks hit the mar- 
kets, business  productivity stalled  and  economic  growth  be- 
came essentially  dependent on consumption. Since the 1980s, 
consumption became  increasingly  funded  by smaller savings, 
booming financial profits, wealth extracted from house prices 
appreciation and explosive  debt. This was further supported 
by a climate of deregulation and a massive growth in financial 
derivatives designed  to spread  and diversify the risks global- 
ly. The  result  was a succession  of bubbles  and  crashes:  the 
worldwide  stock market bubble  and great  crash of 19 Octo- 
ber 1987, the savings and loans crisis of the 1980s, the burst in 
1991 of the enormous Japanese real estate  and stock market 
bubbles  and its ensuing “lost decades”, the emerging markets 
bubbles  and  crashes  in 1994 and  1997, the  LTCM  crisis of 
1998, the  dotcom  bubble  bursting  in 2000, the  recent  house 
price  bubble,  the  financialization bubble  via special  invest- 
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ment  vehicles,  speckled   with  acronyms   like  CDO,  RMBS, 
CDS, …, the stock market bubble,  the commodity and oil 
bubbles  and the debt bubbles, all developing jointly and feed- 
ing on each other, until the climax of 2008, which brought our 
financial system close to collapse. 
Each excess was felt to be “solved”  by measures that  in fact 
fueled following excesses; each crash was fought by an ac- 
commodative monetary policy, sowing the seeds for new bub- 
bles and future crashes. Not only are crashes not any more 
mysterious, but  the present crisis and stalling economy,  also 
called the Great Recession, have clear origins, namely in the 
delusionary belief in the merits  of policies based  on a “per- 
petual  money machine” type of thinking. 
“The problems that we have created cannot be solved at the 
level  of thinking  we were  at  when  we created them”.  This 
quote attributed to Albert Einstein resonates with the univer- 
sally accepted solution  of paradoxes encountered in the field 
of mathematical logic, when  the  framework has  to  be  en- 
larged to get out of undecidable statements or fallacies. But, 
the policies implemented since 2008, with ultra-low  interest 
rates, quantitative easing and other  financial alchemical  ges- 
ticulations, are  essentially  following  the  pattern of the  last 
thirty years, namely the financialization of real problems 
plaguing the real economy. Rather than still hoping  that real 
wealth will come out of money creation, an illusion also found 
in the current management of the on-going European sover- 
eign and banking  crises, we need fundamentally new ways of 
thinking. This will be the subject to the last part of this piece. 
But before,  let us tell and  document the  magic story  of the 
perpetual money machine  of the last thirty years. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
2-The turning  point of the 1980s: 
from productivity to debt 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
2.1 GDP  growth versus financial investment  returns 
	  
Consider the following simple, almost naïve, question:  is it 
sustainable for an economy, which expands at a real growth 
rate of 2 – 3 per cent per year, to provide a return of say 10 – 15 
per cent per year averaged over all possible  investment op- 
portunities given to all investors? 
This question specifically refers to what is called “the market 
portfolio” in the academic literature. This is a global, well-di- 
versified portfolio that contains a representative basket of 
stocks,  bonds,  from  sovereigns   and  corporates covering  a 
wide range of risk exposures, commodities and real estate, di- 
rectly  and  through exchange-traded-funds (ETF) and  other 
financial instruments reproducing their  cash flows, and even 
some private  equity, hedge-fund shares  and  venture capital. 
In other words, it is the aggregation of the investments held 
by all the mutual funds, pension funds, and private  investors, 
banks, sovereigns  and so on. Can this portfolio really return 
more than the growth of the GDP? 
The standard valuation models can help us to frame this 
fundamental question. Take for example  the  famous  Gor- 
don-Shapiro equation. This is based on the simple fact that 
corporate profits are either distributed to investors  as divi- 
dends  or are  saved  as retained earnings.  There is a funda- 
mental link  between the  return of investors,  either  in the 
form of a dividend  yield or a capital increase, and the gener- 
ation  of profit of a company. When  one applies  this simple 
rule to the global economy, this means that the aggregate re- 
turn  of all financial  investments, the  return on the  market 
portfolio, cannot  grow faster  than  the real economy.  In the 
end, behind  every  increased return on investment, there 
should be a creation of fundamental value. 
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Sure, there can be some companies or sectors with excellent 
potential because of new innovations, technology or the access 
to  a  new  market. These can show  a  transient accelerated 
growth. Additionally, profits  can also come  from  outside  the 
country, from offshore  investments and as such be disconnect- 
ed from the performance of the internal economy. U.S. compa- 
nies, operating internationally, have indeed derived, in the last 
decades,  a larger  and  larger  share  of their  profits  worldwide 
outside the U.S. itself. But this effect accounts for at most a few 
percent of the huge difference between 2 – 3 and 10–15 percent. 
But overall, global wealth cannot  grow faster  than GDP  in a 
sustainable way. In fact, any difference can only be explained 
through the existence of bubbles, which in this context can be 
understood as the transitory accelerating financial growth of 
a sector or a company  that is not translated into real produc- 
tivity gains. 
However, in the last decades, it is quite  clear that the balance 
has been  violated  repeatedly by the extraordinary expansion 
of the financial sphere. This phenomenon is illustrated in figure 
1, which compares the real U.S. stock market appreciation as 
measured by the S&P500 stock index in the period 1952–2012 
to the U.S. GDP, and figure 2, which shows the total U.S. house- 
hold net worth compared with the U.S. stock market. The use 
of GDP as a universal yardstick is actually not trivial, given the 
many existing dynamical  feedback loops, including the nature 
of the expectations of consumers  and investors  in the future, 
which are extremely difficult to disentangle. Nevertheless, we 
will use it here  as a benchmark of real growth  because,  since 
WWII, it has grown, in real terms, in a narrow corridor around 
3% per year. It behaves in such a regular and stable way that it 
makes sense as a standard to compare all other economic vari- 
ables against. This is like the “standard candles” that are used 
in Astronomy to estimate  the expansion of the universe. 
The first observation is that GDP and U.S. stock market valu- 
ation  have  grown  roughly  at  the  same  rate,  supporting the 
above  argument of their  joint  balanced growth  on the  long 
term. However, it is striking how the U.S. stock markets have 
exhibited three large periods of excessive valuations followed 
by periods  of consolidation. The  first period  was associated 
with the so-called “tronic  boom” of the 1960s. Closer to pres- 
ent, the  fast acceleration of equity  valuation since the  mid- 
1990s was a clear sign of a massive financial market bubble, as 
shown in figure 1. After  a quick deflation  from 2000 to 2002, 
another stock  market excess developed that  ended  in 2008. 
Figure  2 confirms  this observation by presenting the  evolu- 
tion of the total household net worth in the U.S. expressed as 
a fraction  of the  GDP  from  1952 to March  2012. This ratio 
was relatively  stable, hovering  between 300% and 350%, for 
the first 40 years in the graph. Since 1995, however, two major 
peaks  towering  above  450% can be observed. The first peak 
coincides  with the  peak  of the  dotcom  bubble  in 2000 that 
was followed by more than two years of strong bearish  stock 
markets. The  second  even  more  impressive  peak  coincides 
with the top of the housing and stock market bubbles  in 2007 
followed  by a correction of over 100% in units of GDP. The 
figure further compares the household wealth with the stock 
market. Note the strong co-evolution of the two curves from 
the mid-1980s onwards. This demonstrates that the total 
household net worth has been increasingly linked to financial 
market performance. Household wealth  has  basically  been 
slaved to the bubbles and crashes that controlled the financial 
profits obtained from stocks market investments and real es- 
tate. Interestingly, the present wealth level at about four times 
GDP  is still above  the average  level of the pre-1990 period. 
One  can raise the question whether this is a sign of perma- 
nent improvements or whether more deflation is still to come. 
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Figure 1: Real GDP in 2012 U.S. dollars (dashed line) compared with real stock market 
value (continuous line) proxied by the S&P500 stock index from 1952 to 
2012. The left and right vertical scales respect ratios so that the growth rates of 
GDP and S&P500 can be compared visually, source of data: Bloomberg 
	  
	  
	  
 
	  
	  
Figure 2: The U.S. stock market performance (continuous line) and the household net 
worth in the U.S. (dashed line) in units of GDP from 1952 to Q1 2012. The household net 
worth includes real estate and financial assets (stocks, bonds, pension reserves, deposits, 
etc) net of liabilities (mostly mortgages). The graph uses the Fed’s Q1 2012 Flow of Funds 
data (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/default.htm). 
	  
	  
	  
2.2 From productivity  to consumption and debt 
	  
Figures 3 and 4 digested together offer an eye-opening piece 
of information complementing figure 1. Figure  3 shows the 
historical  evolution of private  consumption and wages as a 
percentage of GDP, aggregated over the U.S., the European 
Union   and  Japan  since  1960. Until  the  mid-1980s,  wages 
mainly  funded  consumption. Thereafter, consumption has 
outstripped wages and the gap has been increasing  dramati- 
cally. This begs the following fundamental question: if not by 
wages, how has this increase  in consumption been financed? 
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Figure 3: The share of wages and of private consumption as a percentage of Gross  
Domestic  Product  (GDP)  for  the  U.S.,  the  European  Union  and  Japan. Source of data and 
graphics: Michel Husson (http://hussonet.free.fr/toxicap.xls). 
	  
	  
	  
Figure 4 gives a first explanation. It shows that households in 
the U.S., the European Union  and Japan  have increased their 
overall level of consumption by somewhat decreasing  savings 
and mainly by extracting wealth from financial profits. Specif- 
ic numbers for the U.S. alone  confirm and even amplify this 
conclusion. 
	  
	  
	  
 
	  
Figure 4: The rate of profit in percent (left scale) and the rate of accumulation or savings 
in percent (right scale) for the U.S., the European Union and Japan. The rate of 
accumulation is defined as the growth rate of net capital. Source: Ameco Database, 
European Commission, http://tinyurl.com/ameco8. Reproduced from Michel Husson 
(http://hussonet.free.fr/toxicap.xls) 
	  
	  
The  final  piece  of  the  puzzle  is given  in  figure  5, which 
shows the evolution of the U.S. debt in percentage of GDP, 
defined as the sum of the Federal government debt plus pri- 
vate sector  debt  (households + firms), excluding  social lia- 
bilities. One  can observe  its explosion  since the mid-1980s. 
By 2003, it reached levels only seen 70 years earlier, in 1933, 
at the depth  of the Great Depression. We will analyze  this 
graph more in detail using our bubble  models in section 3.2, 
and the result  of this analysis can be found  summarized in 
figure 16. 
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Figure 5: The U.S. total credit market debt as a % of GDP (includes Government 
and Government Sponsored Entities, Households, Corporates and Financials). 
Source Hoisington Investment Management, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Federal 
Reserve, Census Bureau: Historical Statistics of the United States Colonial Times to 
1970. 
	  
	  
All these  pieces  of data  converge  to the  same  crucial  point: 
the  mid-1980s have  witnessed  a fundamental change  in re- 
gime, a clear break  in the dynamics of our economic  system. 
This coincides with what Alan Taylor, of the University  of Vir- 
ginia, calls the shift from the “Age  of Money” to the “Age  of 
Credit”1. A change he characterizes by an explosion  of 
banks’ balance  sheets and a “mysterious” break  in the funda- 
mental  macro-economic relationship between the growth  of 
money  and the growth  of the real economy.  In the previous 
paragraphs, we have described this regime shift as an increase 
in consumption only weakly offset by a decrease in savings, 
where the remaining balance  is paid by debt and by financial 
profits  either   from  stock  market  investments or  so-called 
mortgage wealth extraction from house price appreciation. 
The  big  question remains  whether these  financial  profits 
were  somehow  translated into  real  productivity gains and, 
therefore, whether they were sustainable. As long as the in- 
comes from financial assets are re-invested and kept  in the 
financial sphere  independently of the “real”  economy,  their 
prices  can increase  independently of any economic  reality. 
But, in essence, financial assets represent the right to a share 
of some  future  surplus  value,  profit  or  revenue. Provided 
this  right  is not  exercised,  asset  prices  can  continue their 
bubbly  trajectory. However, as soon as it is exercised, it be- 
comes  subject  to the  law of value. At  that  moment, prices 
are judged  against an expected fundamental value and sud- 
denly it is remembered that one cannot  distribute more real 
wealth than is produced. 
The  discrepancy  between the  exuberant inflation  of the  fi- 
nancial sphere  and the more moderate growth of the real 
economy  is the crux of the problem we are currently im- 
mersed  in. This is further illustrated in the following two ex- 
hibits. Figure 6 presents the evolution with time of the Total 
Factor  Business Productivity and shows that, since the early 
1980s, productivity growth  has  been  slowing  down  signifi- 
cantly. Figure 7 gives the relative  wages of the U.S. financial 
industry compared to a benchmark index. If anything has in- 
creased  since the beginning  of the eighties in addition to 
consumption and  debt,  it is the  income  of financial profes- 
sionals that has paralleled the growth of the financial sphere. 
Comparing figures 5 and 7, it is also striking  to see how the 
wages in the financial industry  follow the total debt level, an 
indication of the joint development of debt, financial invest- 
ments and financial compensations. 
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Figure 6: The U.S. total factor business productivity since 1947. Source: Center for the 
Study of Income and Productivity ; Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, the 
Economist (http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/09/productivity-
and-growth) 
	  
 
	  
Figure 7: Actual Relative Wages in the Financial Industry compared to a benchmark. 
Source: National Bureau of Economic Research, Wages and Human Capital in the U.S. 
Financial Industry: 1909 – 2006, Working Paper 14644 
(http://www.nber.org/papers/w14644) 
	  
	  
The lack of recognition of the fundamental cause of the 
current crisis is symptomatic of the  spirit  of our  time. Ap- 
parently, it is hard  to accept  that  there  is something more 
than  just a downturn phase  of a business  cycle; that  previ- 
ous gains were not  real, but  artificially inflated  values that 
have bubbled in the financial sphere, without  anchor  or jus- 
tification  in the real economy.  In the last decade,  banks, in- 
surance  companies,  Wall Street  as well as Main Street  and 
many of us have lured ourselves  into believing that we were 
richer.  But  this  wealth  was  just  the  result  of  a  series  of 
self-fulfilling bubbles. The delusional spirit of the time is no 
better captured than  by figure 8, which reproduces a study 
by the McKinsey Global  Institute showing the change with 
time of the U.S. household debt as a percentage of gross dis- 
posable  income. What is remarkable is the discussion found 
in the McKinsey article and illustrated in the figure that, as 
of the  last  quarter of 2011, households have  deleveraged 
about  half-way  since  the  peak  of 2008 towards  the  “nor- 
mal”, represented by the linear  upward  trending grey line. 
It is therefore implied that things are improving  and, with a 
little  more  efforts,  we will be  back  to “normal”. But  is a 
steady  growth of relative  debt  really “normal”? In fact, for 
the twenty  years from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, the 
relative   debt  ratio  hovered around the  60 percent level, 
which is perhaps by coincidence the  ratio  of debt-to-GDP 
enshrined in the Maastricht treaty  for the countries of the 
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Eurozone. Thereafter, this ratio  started to growth  and  ac- 
celerated until it peaked in 2008. A “normal” debt  ratio  of 
100 percent in 2013 growing along the trend  line implies a 
“normal” debt  ratio  of 140 percent in 2050 and of 180 per- 
cent in 2090! This thinking  is really the most astonishing as- 
pect of the recent  developments. It is the signature of a fun- 
damental transition to  a new regime  that  we will analyze 
and project  forward  later. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Figure 8: U.S. household debt as percentage of gross disposable income. 
Reproduced from McKinsey Quarterly, publication of the McKinsey Global 
Institute, January 2012 2 
	  
	  
But first, to obtain  a deeper understanding of the current  
crisis, let us analyze how the last 30 years developed. 
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3-The roots of the crisis: three decades  of perpetual 
money machine  (1980 – 2007) 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
In the following, we will first go through the most common or 
often  cited explanations for the  current crisis. Then, we will 
give our  view, which is based  on the  contemporary myth  of 
the  perpetual money  machine  and  the  sequence of bubbles 
that  it caused. This section  may be a bit technical.  Readers, 
who want to avoid this, can easily jump to section 4, where  a 
summary  of the main message of the quantitative and solidly 
documented present section is offered. 
	  
	  
	  
3.1 Common explanations  of the financial crisis 
	  
Many explanations have been given, in the media  and in the 
academic  literature, for the current crisis. From  a broad  his- 
torical perspective, Harvard University  historian Niall Fergu- 
son argues  that  the financial crisis is an accelerator of an al- 
ready   well-established  trend   of  relative   Western  decline. 
Others, like Raghuram Rajan, a finance professor at the Chi- 
cago Booth School of Business and former chief economist of 
the IMF, proposes that  inequality has been  the driving force 
behind  the political decision to expand  lending to (especially 
low-income) households, therefore seeding the subprime cri- 
sis. The same rhetoric can be developed for the sovereign  Eu- 
ropean crisis rooted in the  massive  amount of lending  that 
banks, encouraged by the European Central Bank, have ex- 
tended to less developed European states  since 1999. Mark 
Stein, from  the  School  of Management at the  University  of 
Leicester, considers  the  crisis from  a psychoanalytical van- 
tage  point.  He  suggests  that  the  prevalent manic  culture  of 
denial, omnipotence, triumphalism and over-activity  that 
characterizes the West  created the  conditions for the  prob- 
lems that led to the current crisis. 
A more familiar  explanation of the crisis is the expansion of 
the sales dominated industry, the “originate to distribute” cul- 
ture, with its strong incentives to sell structured financial 
products. There  has always been a major focus on innovation 
in the  financial  industry.  However, with  no  one,  at  the  top 
management level, really  willing, or  competent enough,  to 
step on the brakes, and without  proper balance  by risk man- 
agement, it can be said that  the  financialization bubble  has 
been  primarily  pushed  by the  sales force. It is important to 
stress  here,  however,  that  this has been,  to a large  extent,  a 
problem of incentives,  as these  sales were doing  a good  job 
within their own incentive structure. The growth of the hedge 
fund industry  further increased the pressure on the tradition- 
al money managers to come up with similar rate of returns. 
The corresponding financial innovation was embodied in par- 
ticular  in  the  extensive  securitization of  bad  quality  loans 
transformed in highly rated  bonds, akin to transmuting lead 
into gold. These Asset  Backed  Securities  were bought  by in- 
stitutional investors,  banks,  insurance companies   and  even 
money  market funds. A whole new industry, called the shad- 
ow banking  system (allowing  off-balance sheet  accounting), 
thrived  on these  toxic assets. As long as home  prices contin- 
ued to rise and interest rates  stayed  low, this shaky castle of 
cards somehow  stayed in balance  because  the subprime bor- 
rowers  had  low interest payments and, in case they  did de- 
fault, their  loan was backed  by a property that  had actually 
gained in value. This Ponzi scheme finally collapsed  after the 
real estate  bubble  in the U.S. burst. 
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Financial innovation was further fueled by risk management 
models that showed how risks could be diversified away and 
made  more  liquid, in particular via the  creation of deriva- 
tives. Advances in  IT  enabled to  price  everything,  which 
gave an illusion of control and led to less common sense 
thinking  about  replication, hedging  and  liquidity  risks. Be- 
sides, most of these models also ignored  or under-estimated 
the linkage between different risks, by not making use of the 
new  scientific  insights,  gained  in  other   research fields  in 
which it is well-known,  that  more  diversification, increased 
homogeneity and stronger coupling leads to reduced mild 
risks (the diversification  benefit)  at the cost of drastically in- 
creased  extreme risks (the curse of integration leading to 
system-wide  risks). 
Financial  innovation and  the  shadow  banking  system were 
facilitated by a general  consensus  that  less regulation and 
government overview  was better for  the  economy.  In  line 
with the  free  market ideology  advocated by Milton  Fried- 
man and Friedrich Hayek,  a wave of financial deregulation 
set off in the 1980s, crowned in 1999 with the Gramm-Leach- 
Bliley act that  repealed the Glass-Steagall act of 1933. As a 
result, the barriers between retail banks, commercial banks, 
investment  banks   and   insurance  companies   were   taken 
down. This increased the interconnectedness and therefore 
the  susceptibility  of  the  financial  system  to  major   cata- 
strophic  events.  The  deterioration of  the  quality  of  bank 
capital, by the substitution of common  equity  with creative 
hybrid capital, a blind trust in rating agencies, regulatory ar- 
bitrage, which is the polite name for using innovations to cir- 
cumvent  limits imposed  by existing regulations, and a total 
absence  of regulation of the shadow banking  system further 
impaired the system’s resilience. 
	  
	  
	  
3.2 Bubbles  galore 
	  
Though  many of these  accounts  touch  on very deep  insights 
and  enlighten some  fascinating   aspects  of  the  crisis, they 
merely describe  symptoms as well as facilitating  processes. In 
our  view, the  real  fundamental mechanisms  are  associated 
with  the  change  of regime  that  occurred approximately 30 
years ago with the transition from a growth based on produc- 
tivity gains to one based on debt explosion and financial gains. 
This is a symptom  of what we previously referred to as the il- 
lusion of the perpetual money machine. By now, from the ev- 
idence provided by figures 1 – 8, should it not be striking that 
such an obvious point of discussion has not yet found its right- 
ful place in the debate? Vaclav Havel, the Czech poet, dissi- 
dent and politician, once wrote that education is the ability to 
perceive  the hidden  connections between phenomena. Let us 
take his advice at heart and examine more closely the big eco- 
nomic and financial trends  of the past three  decades to figure 
out the hidden  connections that bind them together. 
	  
	  
	  
3.2.1 Universal bubble scenario and our original bubble model 
	  
	  
A financial bubble  is a curious beast: its meaning  is accepted 
as obvious by the general public, yet its very existence is loud- 
ly debated in angry  terms  among  experts.  Arguably, almost 
any given adult  met on the street  would know exactly what 
one is and could cite examples  in recent  and distant  history. 
The  dotcom  bubble  ending  in 2000 and  the  housing  bubble 
recently ended would most likely be the most common exam- 
ples given. More  well-read  people  could cite the Dutch  tulip 
mania in the 1600s and the South Sea Company of the 1700s. 
After  that, the examples  are less well-known but not because 
of their scarcity but just because most people are not interest- 
ed in financial history and debates. This is changing. 
Due  to the  recent  global  financial  crisis, interest in bubbles 
among experts and non-experts alike is soaring. For the latter, 
a good  bellwether is the  frequency of the  use  of the  word 
“bubble” in  google  searches   and  online  news  tracked  by 
google3. Late 2007, at the time when the former  U.S. Federal 
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan stated  that “we’ve had a 
bubble in housing”, the google search volume index for ”bub- 
ble” began to climb dramatically (we do not imply causation 
here,  merely  correlation). This  self-referential climb locally 
peaked before the end of the year 2007 but has remained con- 
sistently higher during the last five years. Clearly this is anec- 
dotal  evidence,  but  it is also very  illuminating  because  this 
type of word-of-mouth spread  of popularity is exactly one of 
the amplification mechanisms  behind  the growth  of bubbles 
on which our methodology is based. And  it makes  complete 
sense: as more  people  actively  seek  out  information about 
bubbles,  more  doubts  are  planted in their  minds  that  they 
might be living in one and they think, “it is time to get out.” 
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The largest  housing  boom  of all time began  its equally  large 
bust at the end of 2007, the point at which the interest in the 
word “bubble” peaked (again we do not imply causation here, 
merely correlation). 
The term “bubble” refers to a situation in which excessive fu- 
ture  expectations cause prices  to rise. For instance,  during  a 
house-price bubble, buyers think that a home that they would 
normally  consider  too  expensive  is now an acceptable pur- 
chase because they will be compensated by significant further 
price  increases.  They  will not  need  to save as much  as they 
otherwise might, because  they expect  the increased value of 
their home to do the saving for them. First-time homebuyers 
may also worry during  a bubble  that  if they do not buy now, 
they will not be able to afford a home later. Furthermore, the 
expectation of large price increases may have a strong impact 
on demand if people think that home prices are very unlikely 
to fall, and certainly  not likely to fall for long, so that there  is 
little perceived risk associated with an investment in a home. 
What is the origin of bubbles? In a nutshell, speculative bub- 
bles are caused by 1) precipitating factors that change public 
opinion  about  markets or that have an immediate impact on 
demand and 2) amplification mechanisms  that take the form 
of price-to-price positive  feedback:  the  larger  the  price, the 
higher the demand and … the larger the price! This can be de- 
scribed by a universal scenario4,5. First, a novel opportunity 
arises. This can be a ground-breaking technology or the  ac- 
cess to a new market.An initial strong demand from first-mov- 
er smart money  leads to a first price appreciation. This often 
goes together with an expansion of credit, which further push- 
es prices up. Attracted by the prospect of higher returns, less 
sophisticated investors  then  enter  the market. At that  point, 
the demand goes up as the price increases, and the price goes 
up as the demand increases. This is the hallmark of a positive 
feedback mechanism. The behavior of the market no longer 
reflects any real underlying value and a bubble  is born. The 
price increases  faster and faster in a vicious circle with spells 
of short-lived panics until, at some point, investors  start real- 
izing that  the process  is not sustainable and the market col- 
lapses  in a synchronization of sale orders.  The  crash  occurs 
because the market has entered an unstable phase. Like a rul- 
er  held  up  vertically  on  your  finger, any  small  disturbance 
could have triggered the fall. Essentially, the crash is the cul- 
mination of the progressive maturation of the bubble towards 
its final unstable state. This is often misunderstood and a great 
controversy starts about  its causes. 
In order  to understand stock markets, one therefore needs 
to consider  the impact of positive feedbacks via possible 
technical  as well as behavioral mechanisms  such as imita- 
tion and herding, leading to self-organized cooperation and 
the  development of possible  endogenous instabilities. The 
above-sketched universal  scenario  emphasizing the role of 
positive feedbacks is at the foundation of our research. 
Technically, we define a bubble  as the “super-exponentially” 
accelerating rise of a price due to the progressively increas- 
ing build-up  of cooperation and interactions between inves- 
tors. The ascent  due to positive  feedback (also called “pro- 
cyclicality”) is the translation of the maturation towards  an 
instability or critical point reached in finite time. It is a 
mathematical  certainty that,  when  the  growth  rate  itself 
grows, the process  will be fundamentally unstable. Accord- 
ing to this “critical” viewpoint, the specific manner by which 
the  bubble  bursts  and  the  prices  collapse  is secondary: a 
crash  occurs  because  the  market has  entered an  unstable 
phase  and any small disturbance or process  may reveal  the 
existence  of the instability. Our  research suggests that most 
of the crashes have fundamentally an endogenous, or inter- 
nal, origin and that exogenous, or external shocks only serve 
as triggering  factors. As a consequence, the origin of crashes 
is probably much  more  subtle  than  often  thought, as it is 
constructed  progressively by the  market as a whole,  as a 
self-organizing process.  In  this  sense,  the  true  cause  of  a 
crash could be termed a systemic instability.  In the  sequel, 
we will review the main bubbles  that punctuated the devel- 
opment of the 30 years of the perpetual money machine  era, 
using in each case our models to calibrate financial data, as 
a way to diagnose  the  presence of the  bubbles.  In each  of 
the following figures, the results of our bubble  model calcu- 
lations  are  shown  as lines, ever increasing  and  faster  oscil- 
lating towards  the critical time, which is the moment of the 
crash. We stress that these analyses have been performed ex 
ante  (except  for the bubble  ending  in 1987, where  the anal- 
ysis is ex-post), that is, at a time, before  the peak and before 
the subsequent crash confirmed  by its occurrence the exist- 
ence of a bubble. 
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3.2.2 The crash of October 1987: first symptoms 
	  
	  
Twenty-five years have passed since the worldwide crash of 
October 1987, with Black  Monday  on the  19th that  rocked 
the U.S. markets. For many, its origin is still a mystery, but of 
little  importance, given  the  prompt recovery  that  followed. 
For us, it was the first strong warning signal of the unsustain- 
able growth policies of the 1981–2007 pre-great recession and 
crisis era (as well as of the new era started in 2008) based on 
debt  and  credit  that  fueled  at  least  seven  massive  bubbles 
(see below), and that  led to the current crisis. This is readily 
seen from the fact that  the crash occurred after  a period  of 
more than five years of accelerating unsustainable (super-ex- 
ponential) appreciation, which  is characteristic of  the  first 
large  bubble  of that  period5  (see  figure 9). It should  not  be 
forgotten that  this  crash  rocked  global  markets, from  East 
Asia to southern America and Europe into the first dramatic 
worldwide  stock market collapse. 
	  
	  
	  
 
	  
Figure 9: The historical evolution of the S&P500 index showing the price 
growing faster than an exponential up to its tipping point of 19th October 
1987. The dotted and solid smooth black lines are the results of our model 
calculations with two different levels of nonlinearity. Reproduced from the 
book “ Why stock markets crash” by D. Sornette 5. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
3.2.3 The ICT (dotcom and biotech) “new economy” bubble 
	  
	  
The stock markets promptly recovered from the crash of Oc- 
tober  1987, particularly in response to the  aggressive  mone- 
tary  easing  of the  Federal Reserve. This led to some  turbu- 
lence in 1990, but the next massive bubble waited until 1995 to 
really take off. Over the following five years, the Nasdaq Com- 
posite  index was multiplied by a factor  of five (which corre- 
sponds to a 38% average annualized rate of return). In the last 
year of the run up, it even doubled (that  is a 100% annualized 
rate of return). This acceleration of the rate of return is typical 
of the super-exponential growth that we characterize as a bub- 
ble. In that sense, the dotcom  boom was surely one of the best 
illustrations  of  the  universal   pattern  behind   bubbles   and 
crashes  described above. Figure  10 gives the historical  evolu- 
tion of the Nasdaq  Composite index in those years. 
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Figure 10: The historical evolution of the Nasdaq composite index showing the 
price growing faster than an exponential up to its tipping point and the 
following crash, starting in March 2000. The solid smooth black line shows 
the result of our model calculations. Reproduced from the book “ Why stock 
markets crash” by D. Sornette 5. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
3.2.4 Slaving of the Fed monetary  policy to the stock market 
	  
	  
Like in the wake of the 1987 crash, the Federal Reserve re- 
acted aggressively to stem the recession that followed the 
bubble’s  implosion,  by  decreasing   the  federal   funds  rate 
from 6.5% in 2000 to 1% in 2003 and 2004. Figure 11 shows 
this process and compares it with the decline of the S&P500 
and the Nasdaq  Composite stock market indices. It is quite 
noticeable that the benchmark rate decreased in parallel  to 
the U.S. stock market. The key question, however, is this: did 
it lead or lag? According to common  wisdom and standard 
textbook arguments, a decrease of interest rates is supposed 
to make borrowing cheaper. This results in increased expec- 
tations   of  future   growth.  Additionally, lower  rates  mean 
lower  discount   factors.  The  combined effect  should  be  a 
boost  on  stock  prices.  In  this  line  of  reasoning, a  federal 
funds rate decrease should lead economic  growth and cause 
stock market prices to increase. Thus, anti-correlation and a 
lead  of the  Fed  rate  are  expected. A quantitative analysis, 
published by Zhou  and Sornette in 2004 6, showed clear evi- 
dence  of  exactly  the  opposite of  this  textbook argument. 
First,  a clear  correlation is observed. Second,  they  proved 
that a lag of about  1 to 2 months  existed between the feder- 
al funds rate  and the S&P500 stock market index in which 
rates were consistently  cut after (and not before) stocks de- 
clined. This study revealed that the Fed monetary policy was 
influenced  significantly by the vagaries of the stock market. 
This “slaving” of the Fed to the stock markets has been  af- 
firmed  in a recent  study 7, analysing  the  central  bank’s  re- 
sponse  to  the  financial  crisis that  started in 2007, using  a 
novel methodology allowing for time-varying lead-lag rela- 
tionships. As a case in point, the rebound in March  2009 of 
the U.S. stock markets is clearly related to the monetary pol- 
icy and is especially the consequence of the Quantitative 
Easing mechanism. In fact, in various writings, speeches  and 
TV interviews, both previous  and present Fed chairmen 
Greenspan and Bernanke have increasingly made clear that 
the Federal Reserve does care more and more about  the 
evolution of the  stock markets and  its supposed potentials 
for wealth creation. 
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Figure 11: Comparison of the federal funds rate, the S&P500 and the Nasdaq 
Composite indices, from 1999 to mid-2003. The time series have been scaled 
vertically to allow for illustrative visual comparison. Reproduced from Zhou 
and Sornette (2004) 6. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
3.2.5 A cascade of bubbles from 2003 to 2008: Real estate, financials, equities, commodities and debt 
	  
	  
This loose monetary policy of the Federal Reserve, together 
with  expansive   Congressional  real  estate   initiatives,  trig- 
gered  a chain of events, specifically characterized by a cas- 
cade of bubbles. 
As can be seen in figure 12, a real estate  bubble  grew in the 
U.S. between 2003 and  mid-2006. In  June  2005, a warning 
was issued by Zhou  and Sornette in a paper  distributed on 
the  Cornell  University  Library  website8  and  published lat- 
er9.  In  the  article,  they  predicted  that  U.S.  house  prices 
would peak mid-2006, basing their analysis on a newly de- 
veloped  bubble   diagnostic  tool  that  targets  signatures of 
faster-than-exponential growth. 
When  real estate  prices came down in the U.S. in 2007, the 
impact   was  of  massive  proportions. A  structured  credit 
boom had developed in parallel with the house price bubble. 
As a consequence, lending  standards had deteriorated to 
unseen  levels. This is well illustrated by the  occurrence of 
so-called NINJA loans. As a text-book example  of what Hy- 
man  Minsky  called  the “Ponzi  Borrower”, people  with No 
Income,  No Job  and  no Assets  were  given credit  to buy a 
house. These  loans were expected to be paid off by the  in- 
finitely rising house prices. Besides, the loans were immedi- 
ately securitized, and distributed as Mortgage Backed  Secu- 
rities   throughout  the   plumbing   of  the   financial   system, 
eagerly bought  by investors. The following implosion  of the 
entangled real estate  and structured credit bubbles  brought 
the financial system to the brink of a total collapse. 
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Figure 12: Quarterly average House Price Index (HPI) in the 21 states and in the District  of  
Columbia  (DC)  where  Zhou  and  Sornette  (2005)  diagnosed  bubble-type behaviors and 
predicted a peak in mid-2006. For comparison, the HPI has been normalized to 100 at the 
second quarter of 1992. The corresponding state symbols are given in the legend on the 
right 8,9. 
	  
	  
The  exuberance, catalyzed  by loose  monetary policies  and 
the illusion of the perpetual money  machine  described be- 
fore, spilled over to all asset classes. This resulted in a stock 
market, commodities and an energy  bubble.  Figures  13 and 
14 present the historical  evolution of the S&P500 index and 
of the oil price over this period. A clear overall upward  cur- 
vature  can be observed. As we explained before, this is char- 
acteristic of an unsustainable super-exponential growth pro- 
cess. Both figures show the calibration of our proprietary 
models. The  good  fits, as well as correct  early  warning  sig- 
nals, confirm  the  existence  of the  bubbles.  Additionally, an 
estimated time is given for the expected correction. This is 
marked by the grey-shaded area in the plots. 
	  
	  
	  
 
	  
Figure  13: The  historical  evolution  of  the  S&P500  index  shown  as  dots. The dashed 
vertical line shows the last observation used to calibrate our model. The colored curves 
show different fits. It is expected that the correction occurs with 
80% probability in the grey shaded zone. This indeed happened 10. 
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Figure 14: The historical evolution of oil prices shown as dots. The dashed vertical line 
shows the last observation used to calibrate our model. The colored curves show 
different fits. The inset shows a magnification around the time of the peak. As in figure 
13, it is expected that the correction occurs with 80% probability in the grey shaded 
zone. This indeed happened. Reproduced from (Sornette et al., 
2009) 10. 
	  
	  
In the end, asset prices worldwide got infected and a globali- 
zation  bubble  emerged, as illustrated in figure 15. The time 
series represent a proprietary index based on emerging mar- 
kets equities and currencies, freight prices, soft commodities, 
base and precious  metals and energy. 
	  
	  
 
	  
	  
Figure 15: The globalization bubble. The time series represent a proprietary index of 
emerging markets equities and currencies, freight prices, soft commodities, base and 
precious metals and energy. The smooth curves show the fit of the model, the vertical 
green line is the best estimate of the correction time. Only the black data was used to 
calibrate the model back in 2008. 
	  
	  
	  
This cascade of bubbles  prepared the whole economic  and fi- 
nancial systems for a perfect  storm. When the final correction 
came, the global system fell into what is now called the Great 
Recession, the worst contraction since the Great Depression 
of the 1930s. This prompted central banks worldwide to stimu- 
late the economy by cutting interest rates and printing money. 
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Figure 16: The total liabilities divided by the GDP of the U.S. financial and non- 
financial sectors. The data are taken from the Flow of Funds accounts of the U.S. 
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/), the non-financial sector in- cludes the 
federal government, government sponsored entities, household and non-profit and 
non-financial business. The smooth curves show the fits of the models. 
	  
	  
Thirty  years ago, our economic  and financial system shifted 
from a growth  based  on productivity to a growth  based  on 
debt. As a consequence, the  past  three  decades  have  been 
characterized by financial markets, central  banks  and treas- 
uries being entangled in a tango  of manias  and panics. This 
process  has been  fueled  by ever-increasing debt  levels. This 
is illustrated in figure 16, which shows the evolution of the 
total  U.S. financial  and  non-financial  liabilities  divided  by 
the GDP. This picture  demonstrates that  debt  levels are on 
unsustainable tracks  that,  according  to our  bubble  models, 
are expected to reach a critical point towards  the end of the 
present decade. 
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4-The faces of the future 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Summarizing, the perpetual money machine  is the illusionary 
belief that it is possible to create wealth out of nothing. At the 
basis of such wealth  creation is debt  and  the  multiplication 
mechanisms  that  facilitate  credit  expansion. The  process  is 
self-reinforcing  and  leads  to  bubbles.  The  “machine” was 
made possible by deregulation of the financial sector and was 
fueled by quantitative easing policies, which provided easy ac- 
cess to money  for financial organizations. Thus, the increased 
consumption, occurring  together with decreasing  savings and 
productivity, becomes a symptom of a growing and dangerous 
unbalance: an instant purchasing ability was wishfully taken as 
the confirmation of the existence of an illusory wealth. 
The next big question is how long will this perpetual money 
machine continue operating, and in what form? In this respect, 
three  aspects  will clearly  differentiate the  next  decade  from 
the past one: a total financialization of assets in the form of Ex- 
change Traded Funds (ETF), the dominance of the algorithmic 
trading machines and the future evolution of public debt. 
	  
	  
	  
4.1 Exchange Traded Funds 
	  
ETFs  are investment funds traded on stock exchanges. They 
can  replicate  the  performance  of  any  possible  asset  like 
stocks, bonds, commodities or currencies. Before  them, there 
were tracker funds and certificates  written  on indices. ETFs 
are  attractive because  of their  low costs, stock-like  features 
and liquidity. More exotic types track specific structured fea- 
tures of assets such as the slope of the yield curve, the implied 
volatility of a stock market index or even spreads between as- 
sets. Many ETFs are leveraged. The daily performance of the 
ProShares Ultra Silver fund (ticker AGQ) for example corre- 
sponds to twice that of silver bullion. In addition, it is perfect- 
ly possible to buy options  on ETFs. As such, one can buy an 
option  on VXX, which in itself replicates the implied volatili- 
ty of the S&P500 index options. ETFs represent the ultimate 
financialization and  expectations are  high. The  size  of  the 
ETF market has grown rapidly from around 202 ETFs worth 
105 billion USD in 2001 to 4450 ETFs worth 1.5 trillion USD 
in the first quarter of 2012 (according  to BlackRock). Many 
observers believe  this market will grow to 2 trillion  USD  by 
2013, 5 trillion USD by 2015 and 10 trillion USD by 2020. 
But what will be the consequences of the growth of ETFs on 
the structure and stability of our financial system? Many spe- 
cialists believe that ETFs have in the past years been behind 
unexpected price  moves  in  physical  commodities markets 
such as copper, cocoa and coffee. There  is no doubt  about  the 
existence  of strongly  increased correlations between stocks 
and general assets in the last few years, making diversification 
more  difficult, if not  impossible.  Basically, ETFs  create  new 
links between different sectors. As such, the  constitution of 
the financial markets is fundamentally changed  from an en- 
semble   of  individual   networks  to   a  closely  linked   net- 
work-of-networks configuration. Very recent  research in net- 
work theory has shown that, when different networks become 
linked,  the  overall  structure loses resilience.  Indeed, due  to 
diversification, there  are  less minor  events  but,  due  to  the 
stronger coupling, there  are more catastrophic events. 
Additionally, our analyses have shown strong evidence  of in- 
creased  endogenous trading and speculation, which influence 
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soft commodity prices, and which may have a significant im- 
pact in poor countries. In this respect, the New England Com- 
plex Systems Institute in Boston  has published an important 
analysis11  showing  that  the Arab  Spring  movements started 
with the second large peak of food prices in 2011 that stressed 
severely the poor to lower middle  classes in the Middle East 
as well as in many Asian countries. We should always remem- 
ber that  history  is replete with political  shifts, crises, revolu- 
tions and wars caused (or catalyzed) by economic duress (and 
hunger). The ultimate financialization offered by ETFs opens 
the road to more bubbles  created by the herding  mechanism 
of small investors crowding in and out of the investment fash- 
ion of the moment. With the system flushed with liquidity and 
investors  hunting  for  profit  in a zero-interest environment, 
the frequency of bubbles  of all kinds can be expected to in- 
crease. Our own analyses at the Financial  Crisis Observatory 
at ETH  Zurich  have already  quantified tens of intermediate 
sized bubbles  in several asset classes in the last few years. 
	  
	  
	  
4.2 The rise of the algo’s 
	  
There  are lots of talks about the increased importance of the 
algorithmic trading  machines. This new trend  started in the 
U.S. It is now estimated that  up to 80%  of trading  in U.S. 
stocks is done by machines  without  any human  intervention 
or decision, of which high frequency trading  (HFT) consti- 
tutes  more  than  half of the  total  volume. Meanwhile, algo- 
rithmic  trading  is progressively taking  over the global mar- 
kets, including emerging  markets stocks, commodities and 
energy. The data technology company  Nanex has completed 
an illuminating analysis showing the “rise of the HFT ma- 
chines” in the past 5 years 12, which warns about the phenom- 
enon of high frequency quoting, namely the fact that 99% of 
quotes  are  removed within  one  second  without  being  exe- 
cuted,  in a war  game  of hide-and-seek between machines. 
Execution transparency, both  in locality (Over-the-Counter 
(OTC) and  dark  pools)  and  with respect  to National Best 
Bid  and  Offer  (NBBO), is gone,  which  reflects  a growing 
lack of confidence  in markets. 
Using models specifically designed to quantify  the degree  of 
endogeneity (called  “reflexivity”  by Georges Soros)  in the 
markets, defined as the fraction  of transactions that are trig- 
gered internally or are self-excited, like aftershocks of an 
earthquake, and that are not the result of some new external 
information, we recently  quantified that  this degree  of re- 
flexivity increased from 30% in the 1990s to at least 80% as 
of today 13. This  proves,  in hard  numbers, that  markets in- 
creasingly live a life of their own, disconnected from the real 
economy, activated by machines  and the algorithms  that 
compete to trade  in milliseconds,  a process  also facilitated 
by massive  injections  of liquidity  and  the  low interest rate 
policy operating at a different time scale. As a consequence, 
the bubbles  and crashes, that  we have become  accustomed 
to, now develop  and evolve increasingly  over time scales of 
seconds  to  minutes.  Just  look  at  the  flash crash  of May  6, 
2010, when  the  Dow  Jones  Industrial Average fell by 600 
points in five minutes. Many other  similar sudden  drops, fol- 
lowed by fast total or partial recoveries, have occurred since. 
The logic of endogeneity, reflexivity, positive  feedbacks and 
herding   is  more   and  more   permeating  through  all  time 
scales and all instruments in the financial sphere. We do not 
expect  that  the  technological race  will provide  a stabiliza- 
tion effect, overall. This is mainly due to the crowding of 
adaptive strategies used by algorithmic agents, which exhib- 
it pro-cyclical properties (for instance via a preference in so- 
called momentum trading) and a propensity to herd  that  is 
even larger than found in human beings. No level of technol- 
ogy can change  this basic fact, which is widely documented 
for instance in artificial worlds populated by software-agents 
that  simulate   financial  markets on  computers. New  algo- 
rithms  that  exploit  the  high  volatility  periods   associated 
with  distress  and  crashes  are  been  vigorously  developed. 
These are really worrying trends. 
	  
	  
	  
4.3 The future of public debt 
	  
We  made  clear  above  that  economic  growth  in the  last  30 
years  has been  essentially  fueled  by explosive  debt  growth. 
The future of debt cannot be assessed correctly without the 
perspective provided by the history  of its first 5000 years, re- 
constructed by David  Graeber in his recent  book 14. Graeber 
sees the capitalistic  age (1450–1971) as a return to the quan- 
tification and systems of slavery and debt peonage. According 
to him, the new era that started in 1971 is characterized by a 
resistance toward  debt peonage and the emergence of the 
dominance, not of monarchs, but of financiers and banks. The 
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fundamental insight  is the  fact that  banking  has taken  over 
the role of monarchs in the system of debt peonage, even 
binding  governments in  debt.  Importantly, Graeber  shows 
that  debt  has been  the unifying underlying process  by which 
groups  and  societies  have  developed, strived  and  collapsed. 
Human debt  history  is cyclic, with periods  of unbridled debt 
growth, which seem intrinsically  unstable, followed  by bibli- 
cal like jubilees. The  present travail  in Europe in particular 
seems to be balancing  between disguised steps towards  debt 
pardon and attempts to prolong  the status quo. 
Therefore, in addition to the expected impact  of financiali- 
zation and automatization in changing the face of our finan- 
cial markets and  consequently of our  economy  in the  dec- 
ades to come, an even larger revolutionary change can be 
expected from the future  evolution of government debts. In 
a  report, published by  the  Bank  of  International Settle- 
ments  in 2010 15, Stephen G. Cecchetti, M.S. Mohanty and 
Fabrizio  Zampolli, go through great  lengths  to explain  the 
inherent risk in the future  of the public debt trajectory. Fig- 
ure  17 summarizes  their  Debt/GDP  projections, over  the 
next 30 years, for a dozen  major  industrial economies.  It is 
clear that, if no substantial measures are taken, the debt bur- 
den of the public sector  will grow to unsustainable propor- 
tions. Just keeping  the status  quo in the face of existing ex- 
cesses  and  liabilities  requires that  debts  grow  even  faster. 
One additional aggravating actor that is going to play in the 
coming decades, on top of the continuation of the perpetual 
money  machine  thinking,  is the  future  costs, like pensions 
and  medical  aid programs, coming from the  rapidly  ageing 
population. There  are no savings put aside to finance these 
costs. That is why they are often referred to as unfunded lia- 
bilities.  It  is clear  that  they  will have  to  be managed by a 
long-term fiscal planning,  which will inevitably  come with a 
reassessment of our expectations. 
	  
 
Figure 17: The projection of Debt/GDP in a dozen of major industrial 
economies following three different scenarios, source: BIS Working Papers No 
300 13. 
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4.4 Final diagnostics 
	  
Like the Red Queen of Lewis Carroll’s  novel “Through the 
Looking-Glass” telling Alice  that  “It  takes  all the  running 
you can do, to keep in the same place”, central bank inter- 
ventions  seem to just achieve that, the status quo. Therefore, 
the real question is whether all these activities provide  gen- 
uine  value.  Our  research and  that  of many  others  do  not 
support the  Wall  Street  view that  more  financial  transac- 
tions benefit the real economy. What is becoming  very clear, 
however, is that the deregulation of finance and banking has 
created much more instability. It has addicted the real econ- 
omy to financial steroids.  Banks  have no incentive  to align 
the growth of credit and the volume of financial transactions 
with the real economy. This conflict of interests will further 
prolong  and enhance our problems. The Glass-Steagall Act 
of 1933 addressed the destabilization nature of the financial 
system by separating investment, commercial and retail 
banking  and insurance and by designing incentives  favoring 
the  real  economy.  Many  scholars  attribute much  of the  fi- 
nancial  stability  after  the Second World War to this legisla- 
tion. Its repeal  in 1999 was the  culmination of a decade  of 
deregulation  justified   by  the   ‘great   moderation’,  which 
turned out  to  be just a consequence of the  actuation of a 
perpetual money  machine  dream  that  promised unrealistic 
economic  growth. 
Extrapolating the evidence gathered until now, absent funda- 
mental  collective actions to stop the toxic logic of the perpet- 
ual money machine, a rather gloomy future is coming into fo- 
cus, with  more  bubbles   and  crashes  occurring   at  all-time 
scales, increasing systemic instability, dilution of wealth via 
disguised  inflation,  unsustainable unreal   economic   growth 
and  exploding  debts,  coming  with  growing  inequalities and 
social  unrests.  The  science  of  instabilities  has  progressed 
enough that one can shape clear diagnostics. The good news is 
that solutions are known and are a matter of political will and 
social contract. We need to go back to a financial system and 
debt levels that are in balance  with the real economy. Rather 
than still hoping that real wealth will come out of money cre- 
ation, an illusion also found in the current management of the 
on-going  European sovereign  and banking  crises, we need  a 
fundamentally different approach. Evidently, we need  real, 
non-financial, economic  growth  based  on improved infra- 
structure, innovation, technology, creativity, all fueled by vig- 
orous  investment in human  capital,  research and  develop- 
ment.  Easier   said  than  done  in  a  world  whose  ability  to 
innovate and  to  grow  is now  stalling  due  to  over-capacity, 
over-indebtedness, an oversized  and monopolistic banking 
system, an obsolete taxation system, socially perverse incen- 
tives and the influence of lobbies paralyzing necessary change. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
5-What can we do? 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Given the above analyses and diagnostics, it is all too tempt- 
ing to propose sweeping changes. In this final part, we stress 
how dangerous are sudden  changes in the management of a 
complex system. The difference between the firefighting 
strategies in the U.S. and Mexico makes  a beautiful case-in- 
point that  we will explain  later. Only gradual  change, with a 
clear long term planning, can steer our financial and econom- 
ic system from the turbulence associated with the perpetual 
money machine  to calmer and more sustainable waters. As a 
consequence, there   will  be  continuing   uncertainty  in  the 
years to come. Investors should focus on real value as well as 
the  recognition of burgeoning bubbles  for the  preservation 
of their wealth. Governing is the art of planning  and predic- 
tion.  In  uncertain times,  it is essential,  more  than  ever,  to 
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think  in scenarios: what can happen in the future,  and, what 
would be the effect on your wealth and capital? How can you 
protect yourself and your dearest against adverse scenarios? 
In  the  following,  we  examine  the  question “what  can  we 
do?” from the macro level, discussing the fundamental issue 
of incentives  and  of constructing and  predicting scenarios. 
We then conclude  with investment insights. 
	  
	  
	  
5.1 It is all about incentives 
	  
All  discussions  about  change  are  superficial  and  naïve  if 
they do not touch  upon  the fundamental drivers  of people, 
their  incentives.  Unsustainable situations are  often  caused 
by misaligned  incentives.  There  are  many  examples,  from 
the loss of the fiduciary principle 16, and the reward  of finan- 
cial managers in relative  rather than  absolute value  terms 
enhancing the short term impact of luck and randomness at 
the  expense  of long-term economically meaningful invest- 
ments, the encouragement of corporate management to 
misreport and  develop  frauds  by the  existing  legal system 
allowing unbridled retroactive lawsuits (of course, account- 
ability and responsibility for errors  from the past is essen- 
tial but not as done  today),  all the way to the medical  and 
pharmaceutical industries that  have the rational economic 
incentive  to keep  us all marginally  ill 17. To get out  of this 
catch  22 situation, a major  overhaul of the  incentive  sys- 
tems of our societies  should  be the priority.  Guidance may 
be obtained for instance  from  Memorial Nobel  prize  win- 
ner (2009) Elinor  Ostrom’s  work on collective action to en- 
sure long-term sustainable resource yields based  on design 
principles  promoting stable  bottom-up management 18. Ex- 
amples of concrete applications where the collective action 
approach has  shown  positive  results  include  the  manage- 
ment of resources extracted from forests, fisheries, oil fields, 
grazing  lands, and  irrigation systems  in many  parts  of the 
World. 
	  
	  
	  
5.2 Managing the transition by planning and predicting 
	  
Richard Werner, of the  University  of Southampton in the 
UK, presents in a recent paper 19 a nice example of how better 
monitoring and management systems could substantially im- 
prove the resilience  of our economic  and financial system. In 
his research, Werner makes a clear distinction  between credit 
that boosts the real economy and credit that fuels asset prices 
and bubbles. Banks are the creators of money through credit. 
Werner proposes that  this process  should  be carefully  moni- 
tored, so that we have a better understanding of which mon- 
ey is used for the real and which is used for the financial econ- 
omy. He takes this even one step further. A system of what he 
calls “credit   guidance” should  be  designed  by  the  central 
banks. This could steer credit and newly created money in the 
direction of the real economy, to be used to increase  produc- 
tivity and GDP-growth. In Germany for example, this “credit 
guidance” comes naturally from the structure of the banking 
system itself. There, 70% of the deposits  are accounted for by 
over 1,000 locally headquartered small savings and coopera- 
tive banks. These  institutions focus on lending  to the house- 
hold  and  productive SME  sector. While  less technically  so- 
phisticated than  the  international banks,  these  small  banks 
show core competence by knowing their customers. A better 
monitoring and  management of the  credit  and  money  crea- 
tion process, together with a banking  sector  that  is naturally 
interwoven in the real economy, will certainly  make our eco- 
nomic and financial system much more resilient. 
This common  sense approach is part  of the solutions  to our 
problems, by putting  emphasis  on the simple rather than  on 
the complex. But the present trend  towards  more  and more 
complexity,  as witnessed  in the  ever  more  complex  regula- 
tions, is not a good sign. Take  the Dodd-Frank act of 2010 of 
financial regulations, which runs to 848 pages (compared with 
30 pages for the Glass-Steagall act of 1933), with almost  400 
more pieces of detailed rule-making for implementation and 
less than half of the rules being finalized at the time of writing 
(October 2012). 
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Figure 18: Left: Number of fires plotted against burn area for Baja Califoria (Mex- ico) and 
Southern California (U.S.) from 1972 to 1980. Chaparral is a shrub land or heathland 
plant community found primarily in the U.S. state of California and in the northern 
portion of the Baja California peninsula, Mexico. Reproduced from Minnich, 1983 20. 
Right: Space photograph of the October 2007 California wildfires that led to 2000 km2 
of land burned from Santa Barbara County to the US-Mexico border. 
	  
	  
The impact of simple versus complex methods is perhaps no- 
where  better  illustrated than  in  the  distinct  management 
styles of forest  fires in Southern California in the U.S. com- 
pared with Baja California in the North-Western part of Mex- 
ico, two regions with essentially the same climate and vegeta- 
tion.  In  the  former,  the  objective  is to  stop  all fires. In  the 
latter, it is laissez-faire, arguably  due to weaker resources and 
smaller  loss exposure. The results  are drastically  different as 
shown in the left panel of figure 18: while Southern California 
has few small fires, extremely large  fires are  shockingly  fre- 
quent, corresponding to conflagrations that occur when a set 
of negative  factors  combines  together (e.g. the accumulation 
of wood fuel, hot weather, strong wind) that no human efforts 
can stem as exemplified  by the October 2007 California wild- 
fires; in contrast, Baja  California is graced  with many  small 
and essentially no large fires. Inspired by this observation, the 
laissez-faire  strategy  was applied  to fire management in Yel- 
lowstone  Park. But to the dismay of the decision makers  this 
turned into an inferno. What was forgotten is that the favora- 
ble situation in Baja California stems from the self-organized 
dynamics between forest  growth and fires that  keep  them  in 
balance  and that has evolved over many decades. In contrast, 
the laissez-faire strategy was transplanted to the Yellowstone 
Park after decades of strong fire reduction efforts, placing the 
system in an unstable state with large accumulated wood fuel. 
As  a consequence, the  initial  conditions were  not  adapted 
and the strategy  backfired  (pun  intended). By this example, 
we learn that one cannot change a system without risking cat- 
astrophic readjustments. The financial and economic  systems 
are addicted to financial steroids, and we need a gradual  and 
careful  approach to manage  the  change  from  the  perpetual 
machine  debt approach to a more sustainable regime. 
“Gouverner, c’est prévoir” (Governing is the art of planning 
and  predicting). This  quip  by Émile  de  Girardin, the  19th 
century  French  journalist and politician, summarizes  a pos- 
sible approach for steering  this transition, namely  through 
the  development  of  Observatories  for  economics   and  fi- 
nance,  built  on  an  interdisciplinary consortium  of  econo- 
mists, natural scientists,  computer scientists  and  engineers, 
to combine  their  expertise to forecast  and anticipate loom- 
ing instabilities. Only by measuring, monitoring and predict- 
ing can one  really  shape  an informed view to manage  and 
govern.  But,  unfortunately,  economics   and  finance  have 
been  stalled  by a general  dogmatic  refusal  to embrace the 
technology of the natural sciences, including its rigorous val- 
idation  process. As a case in point, it is shocking  that essen- 
tially none of the economic  and financial forecasts  routinely 
provided by  the  many  public  and  private   agencies  in  all 
countries, which are  used  by decision  makers  and  govern- 
ment  to shape their  policies, are examined ex-post to assess 
their  predictive merits.  We  are  like  the  elegant  butterflies 
flying in the  dark,  attracted to the  illusory  light of predic- 
tion, burning  ourselves  with repeated errors, just to fly again 
and  again  toward  the  illusory  light. Never  learning,  always 
active, finding solace in our hyper-activity, however  poor  its 
track  record,  which is anyway  ignored  in the  flurry  of the 
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present. The  Financial  Crisis  Observatory at  ETH  Zurich 
launched in 2008 has the clear objective of filling up this gap, 
by monitoring and diagnosing financial bubbles  and insta- 
bilities.  Even  more  ambitious is the  European Economic 
and  Financial  Exploratory that  is contemplated within  the 
FuturICT large  scale European research initiative 21  which 
aims at continuously monitoring and  evaluating the  status 
of the economies  of countries in their  various  components, 
developing new reliable  diagnostic  tools and providing  the 
framework to perform what-if analyses  and scenario  evalu- 
ations  to inform  decision  makers  and help develop  innova- 
tive policy, market and regulation designs. 
	  
	  
	  
5.3 Investment insights 
	  
What about  investments? How can a responsible investor 
protect herself  against  the possible  hardships ahead? In our 
view, this should be done by planning and predicting; thinking 
in scenarios  and focusing on protection and preservation. 
A  first essential  ingredient is the  need  for  what  we call a 
“time-at-risk” approach. This takes into account  the intrinsic 
non-stationary nature of  financial  markets and  the  impor- 
tance of monitoring bubbles to diagnose the critical points as- 
sociated  with their bursts. This can lead to investment strate- 
gies that profit from the knowledge of bubbles. 
Secondly, in a context of zero short-term interest rates, almost 
unprecedented low long-term yields and the specter  of infla- 
tion, the global insight and landscape painted above suggest a 
focus on real value, ensuring  long-term sustainability, i.e. the 
protection of capital  rather than  the  quest  for high returns. 
Focusing on physical commodities and what is really needed 
in the economy on the medium and long term (industrial met- 
als, energy, food)  or natural resources (like the Harvard en- 
dowment  trust  investing  in Romanian Forests) seems  abso- 
lutely necessary. 
In a world of galloping sovereign debts, some corporate debts 
clearly provide  safer investment than government bonds. Ad- 
ditionally,  with  the  (non-official  but  real)  focus  of  central 
banks on stock markets, it would be unreasonable to stay out 
of them for their potential for appreciation, to stay in place in 
real purchasing power. 
Small and medium  size firms with value (large book-to-mar- 
ket)   have  historically   delivered the  highest  returns,  even 
when  adjusted for  survival  biases. There  is no  better time 
than in periods of uncertainties to be “contrarian” and invest 
in entrepreneurial projects, with a rigorous  diligence applied 
to the detection of innovations and the talent  and passion of 
the  entrepreneurs and  directors. Many  of the  great  compa- 
nies, such as Apple, General Electric, IBM, Hewlett-Packard, 
and Microsoft  were launched at times of recessions. 
A delicate balance on a case-to-case basis has to be found 
between investment in (private) equity to provide  access to 
real   company   investments  and  corporate  credit   to  give 
“credit  to the real economy”. The choice of duration should 
not be “one clothe for all” but chiseled to each specific bond 
structure. 
There  is also the possibility to be “long” core inflation (CPI) 
in the form of TIPS (Inflation protection Treasuries). How- 
ever, the  large  demand for this type  of instruments makes 
them  more  and more  de-correlated to inflation, a signature 
of an arbitrage opportunity that is disappearing. In the same 
spirit, due to the concerted action  of governments and cen- 
tral banks, financial volatility seems quite cheap and can pro- 
vide another edge against the future  turbulences. 
In conclusion, our main message is that our economy has be- 
come ever more financialized  in the past three  decades  in an 
unsustainable illusion of a perpetual money machine. The 
corollary  is that  true  and sustainable value is more  likely to 
be found in sectors that have the potential for real growth of 
production through new technologies, innovations and crea- 
tivity such as biotechnology and health  care. 
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